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In warm and pleasant weather the Naval Reserve imperatively requires training in "cutting-out" drills, distant boat service, and actual handling of guns aboard ship. The last-named training, which includes target-practice, is indispensable to the perfection of the force as an efficient auxiliary to the navy. It is beyond question that the men must have some experience in firing from the rolling deck of a vessel under steam at a mark moved about by the heave of the sea. Otherwise, if called suddenly into service, they would be confronted with conditions wholly new to them. Gunnery from an earthen or stone barbette is very different from gunnery on a deck which has not a fixed level and not even a permanent angle of inclination.

It is not necessary that the State of New York should build a ship for the training of its Naval Reserve forces. There is no reason to doubt the readiness of the national government to furnish the vessel. In a recent report Secretary Tracy urged upon Congress with great earnestness the necessity of building coast- and harbor-defence vessels, and he added that such craft would be of much value in training naval-reserve forces. The complete delivery of any one of these vessels into the hands of any reserve body was, of course, not contemplated by the Secretary, because there would be legal as well as practical obstacles in the way of such a transaction. But, on the other hand, the harbor-defence vessel might be maintained at a very economical cost to the national government with a very small force of officers and men—just enough to man her engines and boilers, and to take care of the vessel at her berth in a navy-yard. When taken out into the bay or its adjacent waters, she would be fully manned by a Naval Reserve battalion, whose men would be wholly equal to the task of handling her batteries, her boats, and her ground tackle.

This plan, or one not very dissimilar, must eventually be adopted for the full development of the possibilities of the Naval Reserve. It is, like every war-ship's company, an amphibious organization, designed to serve both ashore and afloat. To confine it to an armory would be to invite it to "hang its clothes on a hickory limb and not go near the water." To bid it seek all its instruction aboard a United States war-ship would be to cripple the organization and to impose upon the national government a burden which ought to rest on the shoulders of the State. The Naval Reserve is worthy of good treatment at the hands of both. Two nurses will not be too many to take care of such a promising infant.

W. J. HENDERSON.

THE NEXT AMENDMENT.

THE men who devised the framework of the government of the United States intended and proposed that it should be capable of adjustment to the needs of any changed conditions not then by them foreseen. It is for this declared reason that the Constitution provides, guardedly, for its own amendment. The unforeseen changes have from time to time demanded such action as was provided for, but the aggregate popular mind, which expresses its supreme will in the terms of the Great Charter, is conservatively slow to recognize and respond to these consecutive demands. This conservatism was manifested, almost ruinously, in the tardy and convulsive advances to the constitutional settlement of the fundamental slavery question.

As the constitution now stands, and as it must, in form at least, remain, new States may be added, in a kind of creation, even by the division of old States, but no provision exists or can be made for the obliteration of any of

the existing commonwealths of the Union. However small may be the area or the population of any member of the federal family, or however grotesque may seem its vested right to equal rank and power in the Senate with its greater associates, that rank and power cannot be directly interfered with by any process yet invented. That there is here a defect presenting matter for serious consideration has long since been generally admitted. It becomes more glaring, it attracts more attention, and it threatens to become a source of more dangerous irritation, year after year, as the disproportion, for example, between New York and Delaware requires more and more offensive figures to declare its political arithmetic.

So great a defect implies a discoverable remedy, and there are signs that one is in due process of discovery by means of a species of normal evolution, every way preferable to revolution.

If much of the party and partisan history of the country is associated with State geographical boundary lines, more attaches to the action, in combination or semi-combination, of the States adhering politically in groups. The history of the Civil War presents the most perfect illustration, and is also full of instructive suggestions as to the nature of the practical remedy. At the outset of the war, the cotton States led off, as a group, acting almost as one State. The Atlantic Southern States followed as another, and the refusal of the border States to follow promptly and effectively prepared for the failure of the Confederacy. Each group drew its membership together in obedience to a natural law of American politics, plainly written in our history, but not defined or utilized in our constitution.

In the school geographies of the last generation, the natural grouping of the States at that time was set forth as the New England, Middle, Southern, and Western. The existence of the political fact was recognized and was taught to all children.

If, now, for an inquiry into one phase of this subject we select the New England States, we may find that this group has undergone changes latterly, but that these are less apparent to the eye than are some of the mutations of the other groups. There are, however, very readable indications of one irresistible tendency. The school-books said that it consisted of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut. All of these old commonwealths retain their boundaries, their nominal State organisms, and their representative power in the Senate of the United States. If, however, it is true that Maine and Massachusetts are at this day States, in the full definition of the term, what is to be said of the progressive conditions of the others? If they could be considered as the asserted roots of a great national tree, would it not be nearly correct to reply that they are rather so many bunches of rootlets, attaching permanently to several central or main roots? Are their boundary lines upon the map entitled to the political significance which the constitution accords to them?

The present examination does not contain any necessity for now indicating the precise composition of a new group which might be constructed, for purposes of reformed administration and federal representation, as the New England group. The pertinent suggestion is that one might well be created, that it yet will be created, and that it will enjoy, measurably, the powers, or some of them, which are now exercised by one of the existing States. Without attempting the elaboration of details, the new organism, of whatever allied elements, will be a State as to its relations with the federal government, without too great a disturbance of existing forms of

local self-government. In adjusted correlation with other groups, it will be entitled to representation in a reorganized national Senate and House. In the former body there will then be no such monstrosity as a fictitious equipoise between Rhode Island and Pennsylvania.

It is manifest that the powers of the central, national machinery, acting at and from Washington, would be relieved of clogging and pressure, but in no manner diminished, by the successful working of groups, operating as States within the limits assigned to them. The reformed mechanism, in part and in whole, will be entirely in accord with what is called the "genius"—that is, with the integral principles—of our complex idea of representative republican government.

The Middle State group was said by the school-books to consist of New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland. It is evident that this old listing offers hardly an indication of the constituent parts of a new, self-governing independency in union, with New York as its main stem.

It is assuredly premature to discuss the future, in this relation, of the British provinces north of us, or to surmise what parts of them might, for instance, be well associated with Maine in a Northeastern group, or how the other provinces would prefer to be associated or severed.

There is an area related to Pennsylvania of which the natural State membership would fall into correct relations and position as readily as do the pieces upon a chessboard. Somewhat the same is true of the Atlantic States, south of the Potomac; of the central States between Pennsylvania and the Mississippi, north of the Ohio; of a corresponding group south of the Ohio; of the southern and southeastern cotton States; of the Gulf group; the group immediately west of the Mississippi; of the Northwestern group proper; of the Far Northwest; of the Mountain group; of the Pacific Northern; of the Pacific Southern; and, eventually, of the Southern Mountain group.

Leaving indefinite all questions of absolute selection, there are at least eighteen probable groups, much exceeding in number the cluster of stars upon the first flag of the republic. Each of these ideal associations has already distinctive interests, progressively becoming more apparent and more plainly acknowledged by its citizens. It is more and more commonly understood and asserted that these interests demand, for their proper care, both legislative and executive capacity exceeding that of the present local organisms, State or municipal, but which cannot be transferred to or undertaken by the overburdened, far-away, and practically unappreciating central government at Washington. The truth demands very full recognition that this country is too vast for successful centralization, however absolute is its need for permanent, unassailable nationality in its representative union. Its fast-increasing parts must therefore be governed through adjusted and adjustable machinery, both adapted to and developed from the fundamental idea of the original, existing organism. The machinery now in use announces, in every creak of its patriotic helplessness, that it is forced to bear too much and that, unless it shall be relieved, it must shortly break down.

The presentation of a political necessity and of its attendant problems to a self-governing, intelligent people, carries with it not only a demand for, but a rational assurance of, eventual action and successful solution. All growths of public opinion, all questions of methods and details, are sure of elaborate counsel and discussion, but there is no necessity for the discovery

or invention of anything novel, which would be popularly offensive as foreign. The actual grouping of the States has gone on from the beginning, from an earlier day than, for instance, the birth of George Washington, and the British provinces of North America acted in groups when the Dutch held New York and the French held the Canadas. The same action goes on now, increasingly, and the natural affinities and political necessities producing it only require something of boldness and wisdom in applied statesmanship in order to produce a reform which would assure the best results locally, and would, at the same time, give more firmness and stability, as well as greater freedom and effectiveness of administration, to the national government.

WILLIAM O. STODDARD.